Article by

Introduction
The Digital News Publishers Association (DNPA) has approached the Supreme Court challenging provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) and the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 (DPDP Rules). The petition raises concerns about the absence of a specific exemption for journalistic activities, government access to information and the amendment to the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act).
What Has the DNPA Challenged?
Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on 6 October 2026, the petition, Digital News Publishers Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., names the DNPA and independent investigative journalist Yukta Mudgal as petitioners.
The petition challenges Sections 7, 17(2), 18, 19, 27, 29, 36, 37 and 44(3) of the DPDP Act, along with Rules 16, 17 and 23 of the DPDP Rules. The challenge is based on Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21, arguing that the provisions disproportionately affect journalistic activity and the ability to disseminate information in the public interest.
On 27 October 2026, the Supreme Court issued notice on the petition and the application for interim relief, returnable on 17 November 2026. The Court did not grant an interim stay at this stage or determine the constitutional validity of the challenged provisions.
The Absence of a Journalistic Exemption
The principal concern raised by DNPA is that the DPDP framework does not provide a specific exemption for processing personal data for journalistic purposes. The Act does contain exclusions for certain publicly available personal data under Section 3(c)(ii), as well as exemptions for specified research, archiving and statistical purposes under Section 17(2)(b), read with Rule 16. However, neither provides a general exemption for journalistic activity.
Under Sections 4, 5 and 6, personal data may be processed based on consent or for certain legitimate uses recognised by the Act, with notice and consent requirements applying in the circumstances specified by the legislation. Section 7 recognises certain legitimate uses but again does not expressly identify investigative journalism or public-interest reporting as a separate ground.
Government Information Powers and Confidential Sources
The petition also challenges Sections 36 and 37, read with Rule 23 and the Seventh Schedule of the DPDP Rules. Section 36 allows the Central Government to require the Board, a Data Fiduciary or an intermediary to furnish information for the purposes of the Act. Rule 23 specifies the purposes and authorised process for such requests, including certain State functions and national security-related purposes.
For news organisations, the concern extends to information identifying confidential sources, unpublished reporting material and records maintained during investigations. Whistleblowers may be less willing to share information if they believe their identities or communications could subsequently be disclosed.
Section 37 separately permits the Central Government to direct the blocking of public access to specified information, but only on a written reference from the Board indicating that monetary penalties have been imposed on the Data Fiduciary in two or more instances and advising blocking in the interests of the general public. The affected Data Fiduciary must be given an opportunity to be heard, and the Government must record reasons for its decision. The petitioners question whether these conditions provide sufficient protection against disproportionate interference with information dissemination. These provisions are scheduled to commence on 13 May 2027, rather than being operative on the date of this article.
The RTI Amendment and Public Accountability
A separate but connected issue also arises from Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, which substituted Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act with the wording: “information which relates to personal information”.
Previously, the provision exempted personal information where disclosure had no relationship to public activity or interest, or would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy, unless the larger public interest justified disclosure. The amendment removes this express balancing language from Section 8(1)(j). This has implications for journalists seeking information concerning public expenditure, appointments, conflicts of interest and the exercise of public power.
However, the amendment must be read alongside Section 8(2) of the RTI Act, which continues to permit disclosure where public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to protected interests. Its practical effect will depend partly on how public authorities interpret the amended exemption and the surviving statutory provisions. See the Right to Information Act, 2005.
The petitioners, however, argue that Section 8(2) does not adequately replace the earlier safeguard because it leaves disclosure to the discretion of the public authority, rather than preserving the express balancing test previously contained in Section 8(1)(j).
In CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481, the Supreme Court held that the office of the Chief Justice of India falls within the RTI Act. It upheld disclosure of whether Supreme Court judges had declared their assets, finding that this information did not warrant exemption under the then-existing Section 8(1)(j).
The Constitutional Question: Privacy and Freedom of Expression
The challenge brings Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and 21 into consideration. The petitioners argue that applying ordinary data protection obligations to journalistic processing without an appropriate exemption could disproportionately restrict freedom of expression and the ability to practise journalism.
The challenge also extends to the institutional design of the data protection framework. The petitioners question the composition and appointment of the Data Protection Board under Sections 18 and 19, particularly because Section 27 empowers the Board to inquire into specified breaches and impose penalties, while Section 28 sets out the procedure it must follow. Section 33 provides the statutory framework for imposing monetary penalties. They argue that the absence of mandatory judicial membership raises concerns about its independence. Section 29 is also challenged because it provides for appeals before the Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT), which the petitioners contend lacks the subject-matter expertise and institutional connection required for reviewing data protection disputes.
Article 19(1)(g) adds a related occupational dimension to the challenge. The petitioners contend that the compliance framework could affect the ability of digital news publishers to carry on their publishing activities. This argument is distinct from the claim that the framework may restrict freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a).
In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the Supreme Court recognised privacy, including informational privacy, as a fundamental right. The judgment is relevant to DNPA’s challenge because it requires State action affecting privacy to satisfy constitutional standards, including legality, a legitimate State aim and proportionality, supported by safeguards against arbitrary interference. However, Puttaswamy did not decide whether the DPDP Act must contain a separate journalistic exemption or determine the validity of the provisions now challenged.
What Should News Publishers Prepare For?
Although the core processing obligations under Sections 3 to 17 are scheduled to commence on 13 May 2027, publishers should use the intervening period to review their data-handling practices.
This includes identifying personal information collected during reporting, documenting editorial purposes, restricting access to confidential source records and establishing procedures for handling correction and erasure requests. Editorial, legal, privacy and information-security teams should also consider how retention decisions and requests for information from public authorities will be assessed.
A request should not automatically be treated as requiring the removal of an accurate published report. Equally, the public-interest character of journalism should not be treated as a reason to retain every item of personal information indefinitely.
Conclusion
The DNPA petition raises questions about how India's data protection framework should apply to journalistic activity, particularly where consent, notice and retention obligations intersect with investigative reporting. The absence of a specific journalistic exemption, the Government's information-gathering powers and the amendment to the RTI Act are distinct issues, but each concerns the relationship between privacy protection and public accountability.
Want to Stay Ahead?
Reach out to the experts at GoTrust today.
Found this useful? Share it.










